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I. Introduction
Somalia is trapped in a maliciously rancorous and senselessly
violent history where all fire exit signs lead to the same cul de
sac of clan-based injustice. The lack of sustained intellectual discourse on the fundamental cause of the state’s failure, on why
the quadrennial electoral shenanigans produce similar incompetent and corrupt “leaders” as before, and what might be the
most viable way out of the current vicious cycle only maintains
the dreadful status quo or sets the stage for worse. And since
Somalia’s challenge seems unique, search for answers compels
one to turn every stone including Holy Scriptures.
As someone who does not subscribe to the prevalent analytical method that arbitrarily excludes historical events, and
refrains from incorporating specific narratives or transformational figures simply because their narratives were prominently
highlighted in the Qur’an or the Bible, this author came to accept
that Somalia is going through a Teah period of its own. Teah is an
Arabic word describing the forty years of aimless wandering in
the desert that was imposed on the children of Israel for breaking God’s covenant.1
Somalis could learn a lot from that period and the triumph
and glory that ensued after people took ownership of their

240

Abukar Arman

shortcomings and repented; after they changed their attitude
or their outlook from within. But before delving further, let me
first say a few things about the ever-morphing Somali political
conundrum and its volatility. During the past thirty years, many
articles, essays, and books were written about the fratricide and
subsequent political disharmony and fragmentation in Somalia;
but seldom about how to solve this ever-morphing problem.
This brief essay will attempt to unpack the complex issue at
hand and propose a viable strategic option to end the hopeless
clan-based fragmentation trajectory.
II. Language Influence of External Predators
If one’s action is determined by one’s interest and frame of mind
and if all political entities are made of assortments of individuals of mutual interests, the growing attitude in certain circles
that the end of the transitional period (Aug 20, 2012) is “Xilligii
kala guurka” or “Time to part-ways” ought to be a matter of great
concern. In a clearly coordinated effort to inculcate certain attitude of apathy toward nationhood and de-synthesize certain
nationalistic sensitivities, the said phrase became the motto of
most politicians, traditional elders, media groups, and some of
the “intellectuals.” Make no mistake, language matters; especially in politics.
These are primarily front-line states such as Ethiopia and
Kenya who may have certain security related concerns, whose
political gaming intentions are thinly veiled. States and freewheeling predators are motivated by opportunities for zerosum advantages. They use conventional armies, mercenaries,
intelligences, and individual political hit-men of various levels
to manipulate the clan balance of power in certain regions to
advance their own strategic or proxy geopolitical objectives.
III. Mercenaries and Influence of the Ghost-lords:
The biggest problem, and ironically the seldom discussed among
the many facing the Somali government, is regulating their con-
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duct or keeping these contractors in check, especially now that
the international anti-mercenary laws are all but defunct. As it
was proven in Sierra Leone and other parts of the world, these
kinds of contractors operate with great impunity while they
engage in various outlawed operations such as illegal mining,
arms trafficking, and serving as a proxy war machine in favor of
foreign interest groups or in favor of one domestic contender or
another. Since 2007, the international community has been fed
the narrative that the presence of AMISOM troops is critical for
the security of Somalia whereas the presence of these troops and
various foreign mercenary security-related outfits in Somalia
may actually be making security more precarious in this fragile
war-torn country.
As I argued in an old essay entitled “Insecurity in Somalia: Is
Mogadishu’s Green Zone Part of the Problem?” broken nations
like Somalia that require intervention from the international
community require a safe area where diplomats and other officials representing key governments and organizations could
be hosted. Hence Somalia’s heavily guarded “Green Zone,” or
Halane as it is commonly known. As a compound dominated by
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) soldiers, mostly
from Uganda, and a network of guerilla diplomats who respect
no diplomatic boundaries and which is infested with “economic
hitmen,” foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, counter-insurgency and counter-stability (mercenaries) agents, Halane
became a mega bazaar for political exploitation and zero-sum
trade. Twelve years after becoming the artificial nerve center of
Somali politics, it became clear that Halane needs to undergo a
detoxification process in order to serve its original objective: to
help Somalia re-emerge as a nation-state capable of protecting
itself and running its own affairs.
Today, though various training sessions in security and governance take place inside the Halane compound, it is where the
carrots are dangled to co-opt Somali officials and where sticks
are wagged so that the self-confident among them are psychologically broken down until they accept behaving like guests in
their own country. It is where the elite with political ambitions
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are required to go to get their blessings and a few power-projecting pictures for social media. It is where resolutions that undermine Somalia’s central government authority and legitimacy are
concocted despite the fact that Somalia’s transition period ended
in 2012.
IV. Domestic Profiteers and Corporate Freeloaders:
The former are men who, through their fluid businesses or
“NGOs,” callously exploited the lawlessness of the past three
decades, and the latter are unregulated business conglomerates
that grew exponentially in the past two decades. While all are
presumably in legal businesses, none have been paying taxes or
have on their own been assisting in provision of public services.
A few mega “corporations” such as Hormuud and Dahabshil
practically own the entire country. Over the past two decades,
these companies, especially those in the telecommunication
business who are granted exclusive right to use the official gateway and country code without paying licensing fees or taxes,
have been investing in keeping business as usual. It is an open
secret how these mega companies co-opt key political actors by
bringing them on board as stakeholders or through kickbacks to
sustain their silence. Meanwhile, the old lady selling tomatoes
under the scorching sun is routinely harassed by the municipality to pay her “public service” dues.
V. Jubbaland Puntland Enigma and Beelstan Politics:
During the electoral related political rancor of recent months, two
of the five regional governments known as federal-states have
openly declared that they do not recognize Mohamed Abdullahi
Farmajo whose term ended February 9th as the nation’s President. They defiantly rejected a number of proposals and invitations extended by the Somali President. They accused him of
political hypocrisy and malicious intent to “poison them.” Being
under the same clan umbrella along with President Farmajo, the
accusation made by Ahmed Islam of Jubbaland and Said Deni
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of Puntland have exacerbated the a crisis and deepened distrust
of other clans, though this latest matter is more complex than
the conventional clan politics as both are deeply intertwined
with foreign powers--Jubbaland with Kenya and Puntland with
United Arab Emirates.
These elements have ignited vicious discord and armed skirmishes that ultimately led to the de facto siege of Villa Somalia—the presidential palace—with four different clan militias
camping in strategic areas with a stone throw distance from The
Villa. Since Somalia never had a genuine reconciliation, the political situation still remains volatile and combustible as ever. The
residue of a toxic mix of beel (community) politics—euphemism
for clan-based distrust—frustration emanating from electoral
process manipulation, divided loyalties to competing foreign
interests, and the central government’s illegal interference in the
federal states’ almost ignited a new civil war.
In late April, gunfire erupted across Mogadishu as “security
forces loyal to the president clashed with units that appeared
to have sided with his rivals, stoking fears that Somalia’s simmering political crisis is spilling over into violence. The fighting, some of the worst in the Somali capital for years, followed
months of tense talks between President Mohamed Abdullahi
Mohamed (Farmajo) and opponents who accuse him of making
an unconstitutional power grab.”2 This was a rude awakening
to many politicians, intellectuals, activists, and other Somali
political actors who relentlessly used to ridicule any suggestion
that Somalia still needs a genuine reconciliation. That violent
episode that brought Somalia to the edge of renewed civil war
underscored the perilous fickleness of the current trajectory to
reconstitute the Somali state.
Though things have been getting better, it is no secret that clannism still remains the most
vibrant ideology that fuels the Somali political machine. Clannism is a vicious zero-sum game that continuously fragments
the Somali society. Regardless of how abundant resources are,
others should always be kept at a disadvantaged or an inferior
position.
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The last four decades underscored Somalia’s lack of foresight.
The society has proven to the rest of the world that Somalis
might be individually competent but collectively inept. And
that, precisely, is the nature of clan politics. Clan politics’ preeminent dysfunction is highlighted in its inability to pause and
ponder what might be in the collective best interest. Beelstans are
fueled by the social and political drama of the moment.
VI. Law of the Land, AMISOM and Sovereignty:
If constitution means a social contract that clearly outlines the
demarcation of authority and who has the legitimacy to exercise
and execute power, and how the law supersedes all governmental politics, Somalia does not have one. What Somalia has today
is a mock document known as provisional constitution without
the right court (constitutional or supreme court) that possesses
the exclusive right to interpret laws outlined in the constitution and others resulting from judiciary rulings. In a nutshell,
Somalia’s constitution has been in a transitional developmental
process since 2012.
At the dawn of this century, the legendary geopolitical strategist and the lightning rod of foreign policy controversy, Henry
Kissinger, wrote: “Africa’s civil wars and ethnic cleansing should
be left largely for African nations….The industrial nations could
assist by supporting the creation of an intervention force drawn
from African nations. A center for training in African peacekeeping missions could be created where American and European advisors could assist the projected African force.” This, of
course, has paved the way for the so-called “African solutions
for African problems” that include three frontline states--Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.3 As is clear in Somalia, this kind of
politico-military model–especially when neighboring states are
directly involved–may solve a problem by creating others that
perpetuate dependency, exploitation and subjugation.
“When one asks a powerful neighbor to come to aid and
defend one with his forces…These forces may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous for those who borrow
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them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you
remain their prisoner,” forewarned Niccolo Machiavelli many
centuries before Kissinger’s locally romanticized concept.4 The
only substantive progress toward viable statehood or reconstituting that collective identity that Somalia made in the past four
decades is this: from chasing winds to chasing mirages.
A country is not sovereign if it fails to fulfil its obligation to
protect its citizens and all others living in the geographical territory that is within its domain of authority from domestic and
foreign threats.
Meanwhile, conspicuously declared in one of the top clauses
of every UN Security Council resolution on Somalia are these
shallow words: “Reaffirming its (UNSC) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity
of Somalia…” Granted, no state is wholly sovereign as such
sovereignty belongs only to The Almighty. However, states can,
and should, have claim to sovereignty. That is the highest political authority within certain negotiated or legally defined geographical territory accepted by the United Nations. This type of
sovereignty is necessary to establish the rule of law, to govern
independently, to protect the nation’s values, resources, territorial integrity, unity, and to mobilize for defense against internal
and external threats.
VII. The Man of the Moment:
Joshua son of Nun was Moses’ assistant and protégé who was
mentioned in the Qur’an, The Cave Chapter or Surah Al-Kahf
when Prophet Musa (Moses) was on his journey to meet the one
man who had more knowledge than he--Khidr is the Islamic
tradition.
His name in Hebrew is Yehoshua. And in Arabic or the Islamic
version of the same figure is known as Yush’a Ibn Nun. As the
trustworthy, humble young assistant and protégé of Prophet
Mosses--a man with unwavering trust in the will of God and
promises. Joshua is revered in Islam as a faithful, brave, vision-
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ary young leader and indeed a great strategist. Joshua’s history
is covered more broadly in the Hadith tradition.5
Somalia needs a new paradigm of leadership--a transformative
leader with a vision, strategic plan, prudent pragmatism, moral
conviction, and selfless ethos to lay down the foundation for a
modern state that serves and upholds its citizens’ constitutional
rights.
A leader who could earn the trust and respect of those he is
to lead. One who inspires them and affects their attitudes and
outlooks and challenges them to seek new beneficial aspirations
and to reach higher.
There are certain universal values that we collectively learn
from the Teah: The importance of faith in God--that He will fulfill
His promises and He will only assist those who make the first
attempt to assist themselves. Secondly, we learn the importance
of discipline--gaining certain competencies and knowledge
requires certain trainings, practices, obedience and codes of conduct, accountability and retribution to deter abuses. Third, we
learn the importance of transformative leadership. In addition to
faith, vision, and strategy, the transformative leader must appreciate the importance of hope and having sense of optimism that
there is a way out of the current state of despair. That leader
must have the patience with the process. Every farmer knows,
between sowing and harvesting there is a process of various
lengths.
VIII. Conclusion
Among the principle objectives that drive the establishment of a
new state are:
1) Creating a safe space for a polity that shares specific geographical territory.
2) Preservation of a communal identity- race, religion, history,
and future aspiration.
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For Somalia to reinforce these principle objectives, it must
take steps backward before taking steps forward. Currently, the
political entity known as Somalia is a web of competing and
counter-competing interests and predatory scams. To untangle
and sift through all these mostly existential threats requires a
moratorium period to administer the shock therapy that it so
desperately needs to survive as a nation.
Every fourth year, the so-called Somalia political, social and
intellectual elite ignore the fact that political polarization erodes
trust, and without trust there cannot be cooperation for the common good to save and defend the nation. Good politics is the art
of converging various interests into foundational grand interest--patriotism--to preserve sense of nationhood or Soomaalinimo. Without trust, all pathways lead to a failure. The most
existentially critical question facing the nation is: How can we
reconstitute a new and a viable state? I do not think another
four year term of a new or an old face will get Somalia out of the
current dilemma. Somalia needs radical transformation and that
demands leadership with radical vision, strategy and the will to
swim against the current political tide. And such leaders must
be cultivated.
In an article entitled “A Shock Therapy for Somalia,” this
author proposed a controversial counterintuitive option: Current
state of affairs is such that: foreign sponsored national reconciliation has been a periodical ritual since year 2000. The completion
and ratification process of the transitional (provisional) constitution that already costed over $60 million has been on-going
since 2004. The periodical U.S. aerial bombardments have been
on-going since 2007 and are now intensified to bi-weekly deadly
drones. AMISOM (including Ethiopia & Kenya with direct conflict of interest) has been fighting al-Shabaab since 2007. The
Somali national army has been under a never-ending process
of rebuilding since 2004 while Somalia still remains under UN
arms embargo. Furthermore, the balkanization process of Somalia into clan-based political entities; each with its own foreign,
defense, and immigration policies, so to speak, has been on-going since 1991. Each of these entities is ruled by an Alpha clan

248

Abukar Arman

that claims exclusive or zero-sum rights over all other clans.
And each is founded or sustained by a hate narrative.
Somalia is already in a muted or a “stealth trusteeship” in
which U.K. still remains the country’s pen-holder or the official
gate-keeper of all Somalia related issues at the UN Security
Council. Granted, the formal trusteeship system was established
to help the Trust Territories (former colonies) attain the capacity
for self-determination and self-governance. This is good so
long as there is a trustee willing to help in capacity-building
and a trustee council providing the necessary supervision and
scrutiny. Once the UN Security Council agrees to such proposal,
a friendly country with proven goodwill toward Somalia will be
invited to serve as a trustor for a period of 4 years.2 In so many
different ways—political, economic, educational, and in capacity building—Turkey has proven itself being a loyal strategic
partner.
The Somali government should establish serious strategic dialogue with Turkey and appoint a permanent commission made
of thoroughly vetted credible and visionary men and women
with no political ambition that may undermine their role of
maintaining the continuity of relationship and administering
the critical oversight needed during those four years. Painful,
ego-wounding, and vanity-shattering as it may seem, that official and transparent humiliation maybe the precise condition to
level the playing field and expose clan-based false narratives of
superiority and equally debase all alpha clans in perpetual zerosum clan competition. Today, Somalia is at a worse predicament
than before independence six decades ago.
It is the only way to streamline the multilayered Somalia’s
domestic and foreign problems; the only way to form an independent reconciliation commission that is not funded and
framed by foreign powers. It is the only way to genuinely negotiate a constitution that sidelines all forms of clan-based rights
in favor of citizenship rights and cultivate the right leadership
to transform Somalia into a viable state. Today, we are where
we were before, facing the same perilous volatility. “ Still the
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average Somali sees his/her government as the archetype of
power abuse, the magnet of demagoguery, the personification
of partisanship, the agents of disunity, the epitome of incompetence, the exploiters of resources, the executioners of injustice,
the promoters of corruption, the purveyors of propaganda, the
distorters and manipulators of nationalism….” Ironically, when
I wrote these lines there was no Nabad iyo Nolol or Peace & Life-the party currently in charge.
As this essay is being written, there is a fierce political row
between President Farmajo and Prime Minister Mohammed
Hussein Roble that is being played out in the public’s sphere.
It was triggered by Roble’s decision to replace Farmajo’s right
hand man and enforcer — Director of the National Intelligence
Service Agency (NISA), Fahad Yasin—over a murder investigation of a young female intelligence officer—Ikraan Tahlil—and
the agency’s seeming cover up. This latest development comes
at a time of heightened tensions due to the aforementioned
cliffhanger of inter-clan violence. I shall conclude, then, with a
reminder that resilience is a state mind. It is the willingness to
rise above adversities and misfortunes by consciously managing
or changing one’s outlook and attitude.
Notes
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